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Nicole F. Munro* and Peter L. Cockrell**

Drafting Arbitration Agreements: A Practitioner’s
Guide for Consumer Credit Contracts

Introduction
In recent years, creditors seeking some relief from costly consumer class
action lawsuits have turned to arbitration agreements for protection. A well-drafted
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clause that prohibits class action relief is likely to
withstand consumer challenges to the clause’s enforceability and provide the
creditor the protection it seeks.1 In the standard arbitration agreement, the creditor
and the consumer agree to arbitrate disputes arising under the related contract.2
The consumer also waives the right to proceed as a class representative in
arbitration.3 Working together, a mandatory arbitration agreement and a class
action waiver result in a prohibition against the consumer’s participation in a class
action before a court.4 The consumer must instead proceed as an individual in an
arbitration proceeding.5

© 2013 Nicole F. Munro, Peter L. Cockrell
* Nicole F. Munro is a partner of Hudson Cook, LLP, in the firm’s Hanover, Maryland office. Nicole can
be reached at (410) 865-5430 and nmunro@hudco.com.
** Peter L. Cockrell is an associate with Hudson Cook, LLP, in the firm’s Hanover, Maryland office.
1. See Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012) (determining that the Federal
Arbitration Act preempts a Washington state law that invalidates class-action waivers); Johnson v. West
Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 370 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,
26 (1991)) (noting that contracts may provide for statutory claims to be handled through arbitration);
AutoNation USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190, 200 (Tex. App. 2003) (holding that while an arbitration
provision prohibiting class treatment may be unfair, plaintiff must demonstrate such unfairness); Richard M.
Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237,
1245 (2001) (stating that “[a]rbitration agreements must be enforced, even if the result would be inefficiency”).
2. Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and
the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323, 365 (2011); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (signaling that courts asked to compel arbitration must
first determine whether the parties have agreed to handle disputes through arbitration).
3. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (reasoning that classwide
arbitration would interfere with the fundamental purpose of arbitration and the FAA).
4. J. Maria Glover, Note, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1748 (2006) (recognizing a recent trend by employers of incorporating class
action waivers into arbitration clauses to shield themselves from potential class action lawsuits); see also 9 U.S.C.
§ 3 (2006) (“If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue
referable to arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in
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Although arbitration provisions are undoubtedly the most effective defense a
creditor has against consumer class actions, enforcement of those provisions is not
guaranteed in all situations or in all jurisdictions.6 Consumers challenge arbitration
agreements and class action waivers under various legal theories, but chief among
them is the state common law defense of unconscionability.7 In addition,
consumers claim that arbitration agreements implicitly prohibit consumers from
spreading the costs of litigation among litigants with common claims, which has the
effect of precluding an individual from being able to vindicate his or her federal
statutory rights.8
In order to meet these challenges and ensure that an arbitration agreement will
be enforced, an arbitration agreement must be crafted carefully. This Article will
review the aspects of arbitration clauses that have rendered them unenforceable and
suggest drafting techniques to counter those challenges.9 The Article begins by
providing some background on federal arbitration law10 and then surveys the
current landscape of the case law while focusing on the recent Supreme Court
decision in AT&T v. Concepcion and its progeny.11 It then analyzes the main legal
doctrine, unconscionability, used by opponents of arbitration in motions to strike

such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the
parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the
agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.”); 9 U.S.C.
§ 4 (2006) (“The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for
arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties
to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”).
5. Harris v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 441 N.Y.S.2d 70, 79 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (Bloom, J.,
dissenting) (stating that “if the matter is to proceed in arbitration it must proceed as an individual claim”).
6. E.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing the district court’s ruling, which
voided class action bans, because it failed to find a two-year limitation period unconscionable); Luna v.
Household Fin. Corp., III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1178–79 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (addressing the need for courts to
balance the value of class actions with strong public policy that favors enforcement of arbitration agreements);
Vasquez-Lopez v. Beneficial Or., Inc., 152 P.3d 940, 951 (Or. 2007) (stating that class action bans are
unconscionable and would give businesses opportunities to commit fraud); Muhammad v. County Bank of
Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88, 99–100 (N.J. 2006) (establishing that, in New Jersey, class arbitration waivers are
not exculpatory clauses and the presence of one in an arbitration agreement is unconscionable).
7. See, e.g., Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1004 (Wash. 2007) (noting Plaintiffs’ argument that
Cingular’s class action waiver was “substantively and procedurally unconscionable”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1663–64 (9th ed. 2009) (defining unconscionability as “[t]he principle that a court may refuse to enforce a
contract that is unfair or oppressive because of procedural abuses during contract formation or because of
overreaching contractual terms . . .”).
8. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 633–36 (2012) (asserting that challenges to class action waivers were made
under two arguments: (1) unconscionability and (2) prohibition against spreading costs of litigation precludes
individuals from vindicating federal statutory rights); see also Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531
U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (determining that “[i]t may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude
a litigate such as Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum”).
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part I.
11. See infra Part II.A (discussing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)).
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the clauses from consumer contracts.12 To respond to and ideally defeat these
arguments, we provide a drafter’s guide addressing this main threat to
enforceability.13 Finally, we take a quick look at the road ahead for arbitration.14

I. Background
Consumer challenges to arbitration agreements take various forms, but to
understand why arbitration agreements have become the battleground of consumer
protection advocates, one need only identify those arguing vehemently on behalf of
consumers against class action waivers in mandatory arbitration agreements: the
plaintiffs’ bar.15 All other issues aside, plaintiffs’ attorneys have the most to lose
from an effective class action waiver provision in an arbitration agreement.16 To the
extent such clauses reduce class action lawsuits (and concomitantly, class action
settlements), plaintiffs’ attorneys stand to lose a large amount of business because
they cannot collect the significant class action fees in arbitration proceedings where
class claims are prohibited.17
The standard argument against class action waivers is that it is uneconomical for
consumers to pursue small claims individually, either through the courts or in
arbitration.18 It is not clear that this is the case, but what is clear is that it is
uneconomical for a plaintiff’s attorney to represent consumers with small claims on
an individual basis.19 Thus, regardless of the benefit that arbitration actually
provides to consumers (and there are benefits),20 plaintiffs’ attorneys will continue
to vigorously challenge the enforceability of arbitration agreements to preserve the
flow of revenue that streams from large class action settlements. It is largely because
12.
13.
14.
15.

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Parts III.A–C.
See infra Part III.D.
See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 44–45 (1991)
(arguing that plaintiffs’ attorneys have the most to gain financially in class action proceedings).
16. See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action
Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 34–35 (2000) (criticizing class actions as serving plaintiffs’ attorneys more
than plaintiffs and creating conflicts of interest between class attorneys and their clients).
17. See Robert Alexander Schwartz, Note, Can Arbitration Do More For Consumers? The TILA Class Action
Reconsidered, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 809, 825 (2003) (noting the significant fees plaintiffs’ attorneys stand to receive
in such actions).
18. See Bryon Allyn Rice, Comment, Enforceable or Not? Class Action Waivers in Mandatory Arbitration
Clauses and the Need for a Judicial Standard, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 215, 247 (2008) (stating that class action waivers
essentially eliminate the opportunity for plaintiffs to pursue individual claims because the costs of individual
suits are exorbitantly high); see also, e.g., Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215, 1219 (N.M. 2008)
(arguing that the opportunity to seek class relief is critical because it “allows claimants with individually small
claims the opportunity for relief that would otherwise be economically infeasible”).
19. Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, The Gold Rush of 2002: California Courts Lure Plaintiff’s Lawyers
(but Undermine Federal Arbitration Act) by Refusing to Enforce “No-Class Action” Clauses in Consumer
Arbitration Agreements, 58 BUS. LAW. 1289, 1297 (2003).
20. Id. at 1297–99.
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of this threat to their livelihoods that arbitration agreements have been so
strenuously challenged.21
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
Enacted in 1925 to promote arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution process
to litigation, the Federal Arbitration Act22 (FAA) provides that a written arbitration
agreement involving interstate commerce “shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.”23 The explicit goal of the FAA is to encourage arbitration by
requiring courts to honor arbitration agreements in accordance with the
contracting parties’ expectations.24 The federal law accomplishes this by partially
preempting state law.25 However, Section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration
clauses can still be invalidated by general state law contract defenses such as fraud,
duress, and unconscionability.26 This so-called “savings clause” notably excludes
state-law defenses that apply exclusively to arbitration or defenses that derive their
meaning from the fact that an arbitration clause is at issue.27
Of the state-law defenses, unconscionability is the most often used and most
effective legal justification for invalidating arbitration agreements.28 Because
California has served as the leading battleground state for disputing arbitration

21. Hal Davis, Banks Follow Brokerages: Arbitrate Yes, Litigate No: Plaintiffs’ Attorneys Say Forcing
Consumers to Arbitrate Disputes Will Eliminate Class Actions and Is Unfair, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at 4.
22. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16, 201–208, 301–307 (2006).
23. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
24. “The ‘principal purpose’ of the FAA is to ‘ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced
according to their terms.’” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (quoting Volt Info.
Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
25. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (determining that “the California Franchise
Investment Law directly conflicts with § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act and violates the Supremacy Clause”);
see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause).
26. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (providing for the validity and enforceability of arbitration clauses “save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”); see also Great Earth Cos. v. Simons, 288
F.3d 878, 889 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that “state law governs ‘generally applicable contract defenses [to an
arbitration clause], such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability’” (quoting Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517
U.S. 681, 687 (1996))).
27. Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How the
California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39, 48 (2006); see also
Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 (holding that “[c]ourts may not, however, invalidate arbitration agreements under
state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions”); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492–93 n.9 (1987)
(recognizing that state laws are applicable when they were established to handle issues surrounding the validity,
revocability, and enforceability of contracts).
28. See, e.g., Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1157–62 (9th Cir. 2012) (analyzing the substantive and
procedural unconscionability under the FAA); Stiener v. Apple Computer, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1022
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding a class arbitration waiver unconscionable); Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 247
P.3d 130, 139–46 (Cal. 2011) (discussing whether a waiver is unconscionable).
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agreements,29 this Article will focus on California state law in exploring the doctrine
of unconscionability. It is to this legal doctrine that we now turn.
B. State Law Doctrine of Unconscionability
Unconscionability is the main defense used to invalidate arbitration clauses.30 As a
creature of state common law, its specific application may vary from state-to-state;
however, the elements of unconscionability are common to all states and can
effectively be discussed in general.31 The doctrine consists of two elements —
procedural and substantive unconscionability.32 For a court to find a contract term
unconscionable and thus unenforceable, a party must show that both elements are
present in the transaction.33 This is a question of law for the judge.34 The procedural
element addresses how the contract was negotiated and focuses on “oppression”
and “surprise” in the negotiating process with regard to the suspect provision.35 The
substantive element focuses on the actual terms of the agreement, emphasizing
terms that are overly harsh or one-sided.36
In determining whether a particular contract provision or the entire contract is
unconscionable, the two elements need not be found in the provision or contract to
a specific degree.37 Rather, they are weighed in a balancing test: “[T]he more
substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural
unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is
unenforceable, and vice versa.”38

29. Frank Blechschmidt, Comment, All Alone in Arbitration: AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and the
Substantive Impact of Class Action Waivers, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 556 (“California pioneered the use of
unconscionability to protect individuals from class action waivers.”).
30. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal
Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1422 (2008); see also Susan Randal, Judicial Attitudes Toward
Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 194–96 (2004) (noting the statistical
rise of unconscionability arguments and the relative success of such arguments in the arbitration context).
31. See Yongdan Li, Applying the Doctrine of Unconscionability to Employment Arbitration Agreements, With
Emphasis on Class Action/Arbitration Waivers, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 665, 670–96 (2010) (comparing and noting
commonalities among five states’ application of the doctrine of unconscionability in the arbitration context).
32. Broome, supra note 27, at 48 (citing Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669,
690 (Cal. 2000)).
33. Id. (citing Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690).
34. Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), petition for review
granted, 272 P.3d 976 (Cal. 2012).
35. Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1280 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Melissa T. Lonegrass,
Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1,
9 (2012) (indicating that this language was originally borrowed from comments to the Uniform Commercial
Code).
36. Broome, supra note 27, at 49 (quoting Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690).
37. Id. at 48–49 (citing Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690).
38. Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Dev. (US), LLC, 282 P.3d 1217, 1232 (Cal. 2012)
(quoting Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690).
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1. Procedural Unconscionability
To determine whether an arbitration clause is procedurally unconscionable, courts
consider two factors: oppression and surprise.39 These are alternative prongs, either
of which alone can satisfy the procedural element.40 Courts find oppression where
there is inequality of bargaining power resulting in no real negotiation between the
parties and no meaningful choice for the consumer.41 The surprise factor concerns
the extent to which the terms of the contract are hidden or are not easily readable to
the consumer.42
When discussing the procedural element, courts will often discuss whether the
contract is a contract of adhesion. A contract of adhesion is a standardized contract
drafted by a party of superior bargaining strength (i.e., the creditor) and imposed
on the party contracting with the drafter.43 The other party can only either adhere to
all of the contract’s terms or reject the entire contract completely. The Supreme
Court of the United States recently recognized that all consumer contracts are
contracts of adhesion.44 However, that a contract is one of adhesion does not render
it presumptively unconscionable.45 In fact, outside of the arbitration context,
adhesion contracts are routinely found enforceable.46 Yet when a contract has an
arbitration provision, the conclusion that a contract is a contract of adhesion will
almost certainly render it procedurally unconscionable in California.47

39. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690 (quoting A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 121–22 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1982)).
40. Broome, supra note 27, at 58.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 58–59.
43. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 689 (quoting Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 10 Cal. Rptr 781, 784 (Cal. Ct. App.
1961)).
44. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (“[T]he times in which consumer
contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past.”).
45. See Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract
Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 479 (2006) (noting that adhesion
contracts are frequently enforced and used in the overwhelming majority of contracts); Andrew A. Schwartz,
Consumer Contract Exchanges and the Problem of Adhesion, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 354–55 (2011) (stating that
“courts have never adopted a flat rule against enforcing” contracts of adhesion and thus conduct judicial
reviews of such contracts); cf. Sierra David Sterkin, Challenging Adhesion Contracts in California: A Consumer’s
Guide, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 285, 298 (2004) (noting that contracts of adhesion are considered
procedurally unconscionable under California law).
46. See, e.g., Burton, supra note 45, at 479 (stating that “[a]dhesion contracts are ubiquitous” and
“generally are enforced”).
47. Broome, supra note 27, at 59–61; see also Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1265–66 (1983) (noting a “substantial body of case law” in which courts
have determined arbitration agreements within contracts of adhesion to be unenforceable).
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2. Substantive Unconscionability
To determine whether the arbitration clause is substantively unconscionable, courts
look for overly-harsh and one-sided terms in the arbitration clause. If the
arbitration clause lacks a “modicum of bilaterality,” courts are likely to find
substantive unconscionability and refuse to enforce the arbitration clause.48
Generally, courts will sever unconscionable terms from an agreement and enforce
the rest of the agreement.49 This might be possible, for example, if the only
unconscionable term was one that required the plaintiff to advance the costs of
arbitration.50 A court might strike this provision and otherwise compel arbitration
subject to the remaining terms of the agreement.
However, a court will not always sever a particular unconscionable term and
enforce the other conscionable provisions of an agreement. If a court finds that the
arbitration clause contains many terms deemed unconscionable such that the
agreement is “permeated by unconscionability,” the court will not sever the
offending terms and will refuse to compel arbitration.51

II. Caselaw
Having outlined the background of the FAA and generalized the state law doctrine
of unconscionability, this Article will now review the United States Supreme
Court’s most recent decision on the FAA and the California courts’ responses to
that decision. An evaluation of these decisions serves as a guide for developing
effective drafting techniques, which we distill into a drafting guide in the
penultimate section.
A. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
In April 2011, the Supreme Court decided its most recent FAA case in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.52 At issue in Concepcion was whether the FAA
prohibited a state from conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration

48. Broome, supra note 27, at 48–50 (quoting Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 151 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1997)) (describing elements considered in establishing substantive unconscionability).
49. Id. at 44–45.
50. See, e.g., Gentry v. Super. Ct., 165 P.3d 556, 570 (Cal. 2007) (stating that the preference to sever
unconscionable aspects of arbitration agreements is “particularly appropriate in the case of class arbitration
waivers”); Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P., 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 773, 799 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (“[T]he strong
preference is to sever [unconscionable clauses] unless the agreement is ‘permeated’ by unconscionability.”
(citing and quoting Dotson v. Amgen, Inc., 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 341, 350–51 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010))).
51. Ajamian, 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 799; see also Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778,
788 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding an entire contract invalid after several clauses were found unconscionable); Ting v.
AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 936 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (refusing to enforce all terms of contract where terms were
“permeated with unconscionability and illegality”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir.
2003).
52. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
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agreements on the availability of class-wide arbitration procedures.53 More
specifically, Concepcion considered whether California’s Discover Bank rule —
which stated that in a contract of adhesion, class action waivers were void as against
public policy — unconstitutionally interfered with the FAA.54 The Plaintiffs, who
were arguing that the class action waiver was unconscionable, had each signed a
cellular service agreement with AT&T that included a new free cellular phone.55 The
Plaintiffs received the phone at no charge, but were still required to pay sales tax on
the retail value of the phones.56 The agreement contained an arbitration clause
requiring any dispute to be submitted to arbitration and also included a class action
waiver clause, requiring any dispute between the parties to be brought in an
individual capacity.57 The Plaintiffs filed a putative class action lawsuit against
AT&T, alleging that the practice of charging sales tax on a phone advertised as free
was fraudulent, and AT&T moved to compel arbitration.58
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that the arbitration
agreement was unenforceable because it was unconscionable under the rationale of
Discover Bank.59 When the case finally made it to the Supreme Court, the Court
invalidated the Discover Bank rule, holding that the FAA preempted California law.60
The Court noted that while the FAA’s saving clause preserves generally applicable
contract defenses, “nothing in it suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules that
stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”61
Before Concepcion, the Supreme Court had said that “a court [may not] rely on
the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that
enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect
what . . . the state legislature cannot.”62 The Supreme Court stated that California
courts were impermissibly interfering with the fundamental attributes of arbitration
in contravention of the arbitration scheme prescribed by the FAA.63 The Court
observed that the FAA cannot be held to destroy itself by permitting the application

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 1745–46.
Id. at 1746.
Id. at 1744–45.
Id. at 1744.
Id.
Id.
Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 853–54 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Concepcion, 131 S.
Ct. at 1740.
60. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
61. Id. at 1748.
62. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
63. Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740
(2011).

370

Journal of Business & Technology Law

Nicole F. Munro & Peter L. Cockrell
of a common law doctrine (here unconscionability) that is absolutely inconsistent
with the provisions of the FAA.64
Under California’s Discover Bank rule, class-wide arbitration is not required;65
however, the rule effectively allows a consumer to demand class-wide arbitration
for conflicts arising out of a consumer contract.66 This rule in California, deriving
from the doctrine of unconscionability, was limited in application by the state
courts to adhesion contracts. The Discover Bank rule states that:
[W]hen [a class action] waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion
in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably
involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party
with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately
cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money,
then the waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party from
responsibility for its own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of
another.67
It is unclear why this rule would even apply to AT&T’s situation in the first instance
because AT&T was not “cheating” consumers out of small sums of money; as with
any other merchant, AT&T was merely acting as California’s tax collector and
remitting the proper amount of sales tax to the state.68 Regardless, today’s reality is
that every consumer contract is a contract of adhesion.69
The Concepcion Court, looking at the Discover Bank rule, concluded that “class
arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by Discover Bank rather than
consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA.”70 This is because of the nature of class
arbitration. The principal advantage of arbitration — its informality and relative
lower expense — is sacrificed by class arbitration.71 In a similar vein, the informality
of arbitration is inadequate for the settlement of class disputes.72 To bind all class
64. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (citing Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 227–
28 (1998)).
65. See Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1109–10 (establishing the rule for California courts which generally
classified mandatory collective arbitration agreements in consumer contracts as unconscionable); see also
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750 (“California’s Discover Bank rule . . . does not require classwide arbitration . . . .”).
66. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110.
67. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
68. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744 (explaining that the fees at issue in the case were collected to pay
mandatory state taxes).
69. Id. at 1750.
70. Id. at 1750–51.
71. Id. at 1751 (noting that “class arbitration requires procedural formality” and “makes the process slower,
more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment”).
72. See id. at 1752 (discussing errors generated by inadequate review resulting from informal procedures as
well as the compounding cost of these errors in class action proceedings); see also Judith Resnik, Fairness in
Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV.
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representatives to a class decision, procedural formality is required.73 The
Concepcion Court surmised that, considering the high stakes of class disputes, and
the nature of arbitration, arbitration is ill suited as a manner of deciding class
disputes.74
In Concepcion, the majority did not dispute that the Discover Bank rule is a valid
ground for the revocation of any contract under California law and thus nominally
falls within the FAA savings clause permitting state law challenges to arbitration
agreements.75 However, the majority found that, although the savings clause
preserves such state law contract defenses, nothing in Section 2 suggests an intent to
preserve state law that stands as an obstacle to the FAA’s objective of promoting the
enforceability of arbitration agreements.76 The majority held that because it allows
consumer claimants to force class-wide arbitration in any case, which the Court
found to be antithetical to arbitration, the Discover Bank rule is an obstacle to the
FAA’s objectives.77 Based on this logic, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s
decision.78
Despite the Concepcion decision affirming the FAA’s liberal policy favoring
arbitration, courts — and the Ninth Circuit in particular — continue to scrutinize
arbitration agreements for evidence of procedural and substantive
unconscionability.79 Recent cases in California demonstrate that the current state of

78, 117 (2011) (“Arbitration’s attributed utilities — speed, low cost, and informality — became more important
as the Court lost interest in power imbalances and in the idea that enforcement required negotiation and actual
consent.”); S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T, and a
Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 270–71 (2012) (discussing representative relief, a major
issue in class arbitration which requires increased judicial involvement in response to due process concerns
related to judgment without the possibility of review).
73. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (“If procedures are too informal, absent class members would not be
bound by the arbitration.”); see also Jacob Spencer, Arbitration, Class Waivers, and Statutory Rights, 35 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 991, 1010 (2012) (noting that after Concepcion, courts required this procedural formality for
all class-action suits in order to avoid the risk of defendants being bound to determinations without the
possibility of judicial review).
74. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752.
75. See id. at 1746–47.
76. Id. at 1748.
77. Id. at 1753 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
78. Id.
79. See Buzenes v. Nuvell Fin. Services, No. B221870, 2012 WL 208051, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2012)
(unpublished decision) (refusing to acknowledge that the Concepcion holding abrogated California’s rule
against class action arbitration agreements), review granted, (May 9, 2012); Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co.,
LLC, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 28–29 (Ct. App. 2011) (limiting the Concepcion ruling to apply to class action waivers
that conflict with arbitration provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act), petition for review granted, 272 P.3d 976
(Cal. 2012); Lau v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. CV 11-1940 MEJ, 2012 WL 370557, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31,
2012) (asserting the California court’s right to review a contract containing an arbitration agreement is based on
California law under which such agreement is void if it is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable);
Plows v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (concluding that the California
Court of Appeals was correct for not applying Concepcion to employee arbitration dispute).
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arbitration in California generally favors challenges to arbitration clauses,80 but
there is still the possibility that a properly drafted and negotiated arbitration
agreement will be enforced. While California is clearly a leader in consumerfriendly law, it is unclear to what extent other states will follow California’s
aggressive stance against compelling arbitration. Still, important lessons can be
learned from California’s cases as to how to draft arbitration clauses that may
withstand attack, even in California.
B. California Courts Find Arbitration Unconscionable Post-Concepcion
California state courts and the Ninth Circuit have been the most fertile ground for
challenges to arbitration agreements based on unconscionability.81 It is because of
the volume of cases there that this Article now looks primarily at California case
law. Certainly different jurisdictions are less aggressive in finding arbitration
agreements unenforceable,82 but to work towards drafting an agreement that a
drafter can rely upon to be enforced in the majority of circumstances, it is best to
study the extremes.
California courts have identified various factors that when considered together
can render an arbitration agreement procedurally unconscionable.83 The courts

80. See, e.g., Ontiveros v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471, 486–89 (Ct. App. 2008)
(affirming the trial court’s determination that an arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable without
a showing of substantial need); Newton v. Am. Debt Servs., Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 712, 728, 733 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(stating that the FAA does not preempt state law challenges for arbitration agreements and held that the
arbitration clause “as a whole [was] unconscionable and therefore unenforceable”); Doubt v. NCR Corp., No. C
09–05917 SBA, 2010 WL 3619854, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2010) (finding arbitration agreement that limited
discovery of a weaker party to be unconscionable noting the unfairness of an agreement that “compels
arbitration of [only] the types of claims more likely to be brought by the weaker party”) (citing Fitz v. NCR
Corp., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88, 104 (2004)). Contra Lucas v. Hertz Corp., 875 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(upholding an arbitration agreement in a consumer contract on the grounds that “in this post-Concepcion
landscape, the arbitration agreement is not substantively unconscionable”), reconsideration denied, No. C 11–
01581 LB, 2012 WL 3638568 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2012).
81. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class
Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 400–02 n.139–50 (2005) (arguing that the multitude of cases from California in
which arbitration agreements are deemed unconscionable defies the norm in other jurisdictions). While
California was one of the first states to accept challenges to arbitration agreements on grounds of
unconscionability, by 2011, when Concepcion was decided, at least 14 states had held that class action waivers in
arbitration agreements were unenforceable. Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in
the Wake of AT&T v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 633 (2012).
82. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Tenet HealthSystem Phila., Inc., 673 F.3d 221, 236–37 (3d Cir. 2012) (upholding
an arbitration agreement in an employee contract that the employee did not read); In re Checking Account
Overdraft Litig., MDL No. 2036, 672 F.3d 1224, 1229–30 (11th Cir. 2012) (ruling that an the arbitration clause
in a bank’s deposit agreement was not procedurally unconscionable under Georgia law), cert. denied sub nom.
Hough v. Regions Fin. Corp., 133 S. Ct. 430 (2012); Soto v. State Indus. Prods., Inc., 642 F.3d 67, 76 (1st Cir.
2011) (concluding that an mandatory arbitrary agreement is not unconscionable under Puerto Rican law).
83. See Lau, 2012 WL 370557, at *8–9 (finding an arbitration agreement “procedurally unconscionable
because the agreement was oppressive and created unfair surprise”); Buzenes, 2012 WL 208051, at *6 (applying
the unconscionability factors in finding arbitration agreement unconscionable); Sanchez, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
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have found procedural unconscionability where the actual arbitration clause is
inconspicuously located in the agreement (e.g., on the back of the last page).84
Courts also analyze the style and size of fonts to determine whether the buyer could
adequately identify the clause.85
Most important to courts is the consumer’s opportunity to negotiate terms of
the contract, although the agreements are almost always boilerplate.86 Still,
California courts are looking for some evidence of a meaningful opportunity for
negotiation and absent that they are likely to find a clause procedurally
unconscionable.87 Specifically, courts noted the creditor’s failure to give a consumer
adequate time to read the contract, the failure to mention the arbitration clause to
the consumer and state its importance, and the failure to require that the consumer
initial pages and certain provisions.88
California courts have also identified various factors which render an arbitration
agreement substantively unconscionable.89 The focus is on the effect of the
agreement’s terms, not whether they appear fair on their face.90 Courts viewed a
term which allowed the creditor to retain its right to self-help repossession as onesided because the consumer was still subject to arbitration for any conceivable claim

30–31 (identifying the two factors considered for procedural unconscionability by the California Courts and
providing numerous examples).
84. See, e.g., Flores v. W. Covina Auto Grp., 212 Cal. App. 4th 895, 921–22 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (“The
general rule that a party cannot avoid the terms of a contract because the party failed to read it before signing it
applies even to adhesion contracts, when the provisions are conspicuous and clear and do not defeat the
reasonable expectations of the parties.”); Powers v. Dickson, Carlson & Campillo, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 261, 265 (Ct.
App. 1997) (“[C]ourts will not enforce provisions in adhesion contracts which limit the duties or liability of the
stronger party unless such provisions are ‘conspicuous, plain and clear’ . . . .”(citing Madden v. Kaiser Found.
Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178, 1185 (Cal. 1976) (en banc))); Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 101 Cal.
Rptr. 347, 353 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (holding an arbitration agreement inconspicuously written on the back page
of a contract unconscionable).
85. See Lucas, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 1004–05 (finding that the small font and style made arbitration agreement
“nearly illegible” and thus unconscionable). But see Sanchez, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 30–31 (asserting that typeface
in an agreement is an item taken into consideration for procedural unconscionability, but that the location of
the agreement on the back of the contract controls unconscionability).
86. See Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 267, 276 (Ct. App. 2003) (finding an arbitration clause
unconscionable because it was presented on a take it or leave it basis and because there was no opportunity to
negotiate any of the preprinted terms).
87. See Bruni v. Didion, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 395, 409 (Ct. App. 2008) (“‘Oppression’ arises from an inequality
of bargaining power which results in no real negotiation . . . . ‘Surprise’ involves . . . supposedly agreed-upon
terms of the bargain [being] hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the
disputed terms.” (internal citations omitted)).
88. See Gutierrez, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 276 (arbitration clause unconscionable because the buyer was not made
aware of its presence in the lease or required to initial the clause).
89. See id. at 275–76 (“Substantive unconscionability focuses on whether the provision is overly harsh or
one-sided and is shown if the disputed provision of the contract falls outside the ‘reasonable expectations’ of the
nondrafting party or is ‘unduly oppressive.’” (internal citations omitted)).
90. See Saika v. Gold, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922, 923 (Ct. App. 1996) (noting that, despite a clause within an
arbitration agreement purporting to allow parties to disregard the results of arbitration and litigate under
certain circumstances, “the practical effect of the clause is to tilt the playing field . . .”).
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the consumer might have.91 Thus, the clause lacked “bilaterality.”92 Also
substantively unconscionable were terms that put the burden of high arbitration
costs on the consumer93 and procedures for appeal which provided the consumer
with no meaningful opportunity to appeal and thus unjustly favored the creditor.94
Considering the facts of these cases, one wonders what arbitration clause would
be enforceable in California. Even one creditor’s attempt to argue that an
arbitration clause was not procedurally unconscionable because the consumer
could have bought the consumer product from another merchant under a contract
which did not contain an arbitration term was rebuffed by a California state court.95
The court stated that it was not obligated to enforce procedurally unconscionable
agreements just because there is a market affording a consumer choice, especially
since no evidence was presented that arbitration clauses were not universal contract
terms in that market.96 The California courts have been clear that the procedural
element focuses specifically on the negotiation of the sales contract in the dealer’s
office and courts seem unlikely to consider other realities in the process of a
consumer buying a product.97
Still, two recent California cases offer some hope for compelling arbitration. In a
case recently decided in federal district court in California, the court compelled
arbitration where the agreement contained a delegation provision by which the
parties had agreed to have the arbitrator decide the issue of arbitability.98 Although
the arbitration clause in this case had the same terms as those declared
unconscionable in the cases discussed above, the court did not find that it was
91. Flores v. Transamerica, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 383 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding that a lender attempted to
advantage itself by avoiding arbitration on its own claims by reserving the ability to foreclose on a borrower
while restricting borrowers to arbitration on their claims).
92. Id. at 382.
93. See Gutierrez, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 277 (discussing the unconscionability of an arbitration clause that
builds prohibitively expensive fees into the process for which the consumer is responsible); Lau v. MercedesBenz USA, LLC, No. CV 11-1940 MEJ, 2012 WL 370557, at *27 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012) (finding an arbitration
clause substantially unconscionable because it would require a buyer to advance between $10,000 and $15,000
to arbitrate his claim).
94. See Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 33, 35 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review
granted, 272 P.3d 976 (Cal. 2012) (finding that an arbitration clause which stipulates that either party may
appeal an initial decision only if the award exceeds $100,000 or is in the form of injunctive relief has the effect of
benefitting the party with superior bargaining power and is thus unconscionable).
95. See id. at 31 (“[C]ourts are not obligated to enforce highly unfair provisions that undermine important
public policies simply because there is some degree of consumer choice in the market.” (quoting Gatton v. TMobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 356 (Ct. App. 2007))).
96. Id. at 31–32.
97. See Ann Tracey & Shelly McGill, Seeking a Rational Lawyer for Consumer Claims After the Supreme
Court Disconnects Consumers in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 435, 462 (2012)
(arguing that by focusing on the ability to negotiate terms of an arbitration clause, courts are obfuscating the
reality that such clauses are presented on a take it or leave it basis, such that consumers have no alternative but
to agree to such clauses).
98. Order Granting Motion to Compel Arbitration at 8–9, Hamby v. Power Toyota Irvine, 798 F. Supp. 2d
1163 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 3:11-cv-00544-BTM-BGS).
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permeated with unconscionability and therefore certain unconscionable provisions
could not be severed.99 Importantly, however, the court noted that the buyer had
acknowledged reading, understanding, and agreeing to the terms of the contract.100
Thus, there was no clear procedural unconscionability to the arbitration agreement.
Had the court found more evidence of procedural unconscionability, it might not
have been as quick to compel arbitration, but the importance of counsel’s reliance
on the delegation provision cannot be ignored.
In a recent California state court of appeals case, the court similarly compelled
arbitration.101 The court found that because the arbitration agreement in the motor
vehicle retail installment sale contract at issue was imposed on the buyer without
the opportunity for negotiation, it was an adhesion contract and therefore the
transaction was procedurally unconscionable.102 However, while the degree of
procedural unconscionability was enough to trigger the court’s examination of the
terms of the contract,103 the court did not find significant substantive
unconscionability in the contract sufficient to void the arbitration agreement.104
Significantly, the arbitration agreement at issue contained many of the provisions
described in the Drafter’s Guide section below.105 The court found that the one
suggestion of substantive unconscionability in the arbitration agreement — a lack
of bilaterality caused by a clause which failed to permit an “appeal” arbitration in
the event a buyer sought and was denied injunctive relief — was mitigated by a
provision permitting a second arbitration if the buyer were denied a monetary
recovery.106 With regard to substantive unconscionability in general, the court
stated: “[O]ne-sidedness, standing alone, is not sufficient to qualify an arbitration
clause as substantively unconscionable. . . . It is the attempt to make the arbitration
proceeding something other than a fair forum that ‘shocks the conscience.’”107

III. A Drafter’s Guide
Even after Concepcion, arbitration agreements must be designed to convey to
consumers the implications of entering into an arbitration agreement and must also
strive to ensure that consumers will be able to vindicate their rights. Practically,
what this requires is that an arbitration clause be prominent and substantively evenhanded. A well-written arbitration agreement will not only protect the drafting
party (and its assigns) from class action, but a well-written arbitration agreement
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
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Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 16.
Vasquez v. Greene Motors, Inc., 214 Cal. App. 4th 1172, 1179 (Ct. App. 2013).
Id.
Id. at 1186.
Id. at 1199–1200.
See infra Part III.
Vasquez, 214 Cal. App. 4th at 1199–1200.
Id. at 1193.
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will also allow consumers to adequately assert their rights. Such an agreement will
be enforceable under Concepcion and also should withstand attacks based upon the
state contract law doctrine of unconscionability.108
So how do we draft such an agreement? The most effective strategy is to
deconstruct the consumer arguments about procedural and substantive
unconscionability, and then draft clauses designed to neutralize or minimize those
arguments. Thus, the arbitration cases surveyed above are instructive as to how to
draft clauses that will be conspicuous in the contract and that will be considered
fair, which as a concept has unfortunately proven to be a moving target for
practitioners.109
The recommendations that follow are not all necessarily required to ensure an
enforceable arbitration agreement. By the same token, an arbitration agreement
that precisely traces this outline cannot be guaranteed to withstand every challenge.
There is no perfect contract as state law is constantly evolving; one can only draft a
clause that attempts to incorporate the lessons that available law provides. We also
note that the authors’ expertise lies in the auto finance industry and thus these
recommendations are derived chiefly from that perspective.
A. Drafting to Avoid Claims of Procedural Unconscionability
The first, and perhaps easiest, drafting advice is to design the form of the contract to
draw attention to the arbitration clause. Thus, the arbitration clause should be
contained in the related contract, or attached to and incorporated by specific
reference to the related contract. An arbitration agreement should be conspicuous.
It should not be placed in a “bill stuffer”110 included in a mailing to the buyer after
the deal has been formally executed or approved. If the arbitration clause is not
contained on the first or front page of the contract, the contract should include a
provision in a prominent location indicating where the arbitration clause is located,
and encouraging the buyer to read the entire contract, including the arbitration
clause. A conservative practitioner may also want to include in the reference
provision an agreement that the consumer has read the arbitration clause and
agrees to its terms. Placing signature or initial lines in the arbitration reference
provision for the consumer to sign further evidences the consumer’s knowledge of
and agreement to the terms contained in the arbitration clause.

108. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (stating that although the savings
clause in Section 2 of the FAA preserves state-law rules such as contract defenses, the section will not prevent
the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives which are to streamline the arbitration process and ensure that
arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms).
109. See supra Part II.B.
110. Kortum-Managhan v. Herbergers NBGL, 204 P.3d 693, 700 (Mont. 2009) (finding that a “bill stuffer”
— a provision within a billing statement sent along with other junk mail — that sought to “lull [a consumer]
into agreeing to waive her constitutional rights” was “sneaky and unfair”).
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In addition, the title of the credit contract should indicate in some manner that
the credit contract contains an arbitration provision. Any acknowledgement
provision affirming the consumer’s review and receipt of a completed agreement
should also contain a reference to the arbitration provision contained in the
contract, and acknowledgment of review of such provision.
The arbitration provision itself should be conspicuous. There is no special
formula for making the clause conspicuous; what makes it conspicuous will depend
on the layout and appearance of the contract. To make the arbitration provision
conspicuous, a drafter may adjust the font, type size, type color, location, and
bordering of the provision.
Still, even when all pages are initialed by the consumer, courts have found
procedural unconscionability.111 Because preprinted contracts are provided to
consumers on a “take it or leave it” basis and consumers typically have no
meaningful opportunity to negotiate the terms of the contract, these contracts of
adhesion can be deemed procedurally unconscionable.112 However, considering the
general acceptance of a preprinted contract in Concepcion,113 the focus shifts to a
consumer’s ability to understand the contract provisions. Thus, it is important to
actually direct the consumer to take time to read the contract and it may also be
necessary to explicitly tell the consumer that any disputes are subject to mandatory
arbitration.
Besides the physical appearance of the contract, the manner in which the
contract is presented and described by the creditor to the consumer is also
important in a court’s determination of procedural unconscionability. Although
this is not advice as to how to actually draft the agreement, it is still germane to the
issue of procedural unconscionability. To this end, the creditor should specifically
identify for the consumer the fact that the contract contains an arbitration
provision. A creditor should also explain in common parlance what the result of
agreeing to the arbitration provision is (i.e., that both parties will have to arbitrate
certain disputes and will not be able to sue in court). It would be best to have these
explanations scripted and approved by competent counsel. The script should
conclude with an admonition to the consumer to read the entire clause with care
and to also consult his own lawyer if the buyer has any questions.
Another approach to addressing procedural unconscionability, and countering
the typical consumer-advocate argument that a consumer did not have adequate
time to consider the contract’s terms, is to actually provide a meaningful
opportunity for the consumer to opt out of the arbitration clause. This could take
111. See, e.g., Lau v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. CV 11-1940 MEJ, 2012 WL 370557, at *21 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 31, 2012) (arbitration clause was deemed procedurally unconscionable even though purchaser
acknowledged by signature that he read the entire purchase agreement).
112. See Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 267, 276 (Ct. App. 2003).
113. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744 (contract provided for arbitration of all disputes to be brought in the
parties’ individual capacity and authorized AT&T to unilaterally amend provisions).
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the form of a provision in the arbitration clause that would provide that within
thirty days of signing the contract the consumer could unconditionally choose to
opt out of the agreement to arbitrate by informing the creditor in writing of his
intent to do so. A creditor offering an opt-out must establish a system to track
consumers who exercise that option.
B. Drafting to Avoid Claims of Substantive Unconscionability
While unconscionability contains two elements that must be satisfied,114 drafting to
avoid claims of substantive unconscionability is the drafter’s most important goal.
It is more important than drafting around procedural unconscionability because, as
has been noted, nearly all consumer contracts are boilerplate contracts that a court
could easily deem an adhesion contract.115 Thus, because both procedural and
substantive unconscionability must be found for a contract provision to be declared
unconscionable, and a court can often easily make a finding of procedural
unconscionability, substantive issues come to the fore when drafting an enforceable
arbitration provision.
Creditors gain a significant benefit from arbitration in class action avoidance,
and so when it comes to crafting an enforceable arbitration agreement, substantive
unconscionability requires that the agreement provide incentives to consumers to
arbitrate and a fair and adequate process where a consumer may vindicate his
claims. A drafter should consider the following suggestions when addressing
substantive unconscionability. Consistent with the approach to avoid claims of
procedural unconscionability, there is no particular manner of drafting an
unassailable arbitration provision in terms of substantive unconscionability. Thus,
inclusion of all of these recommended suggestions provides no guarantee that a
provision will be enforced and, in a similar vein, not all these provisions need to be
incorporated to ensure that a court will compel arbitration.
There are things the creditor can do to make an arbitration agreement fairer to
the consumer. The creditor can agree to advance on behalf of the buyer the costs of
arbitration and the costs of any appeal. The advancement of funds can be
conditioned in ways that will reduce the creditor’s exposure, but obviously the less
consumer friendly the provision is, the more likely a court will be to view the
provision as oppressive and thus substantively unconscionable. For example, the
creditor could agree to advance funds subject to reimbursement of costs to the
extent the claim is found by the arbitrator to be frivolous. An example of a less
consumer-friendly option would be to allow for reimbursement of costs at the
discretion of the arbitrator, or to only advance funds if the consumer is able to show
an inability to pay or that the arbitration would be cost-prohibitive.

114.
115.

Broome, supra note 27, at 48.
See Gutierrez, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 276; see also supra text accompanying note 84.
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Also relating to the financial burdens of arbitration on a consumer, the
arbitration clause could provide for shifting fees to the successful claimant,
including attorney’s fees and expert costs. To remove the stench of oppression, the
creditor can also waive its right to seek attorney’s fees or allow the consumer the
option to file actions in small claims court. This last provision attempts to
overcome the consumer advocate argument that a consumer is unable to vindicate
small claims through normal channels.
In an effort to ensure the “bilaterality” of the contract, if the creditor is
permitted under the arbitration clause to exercise a right under the law, such as selfhelp repossession without waiving the right to arbitrate, the clause should also
explicitly provide a consumer a comparable right under the law, such as filing an
action in court for individual injunctive relief.
Courts have considered provisions limiting rights to appeal if an award in
arbitration exceeds a certain sum of money as benefitting only the creditor and thus
116
unconscionable. Therefore, any right to appeal granted in an arbitration clause
should be limited to the circumstances permitted by the FAA. In that instance, both
the creditor and consumer share the same limited right, which may be amended
from time to time under the FAA and is not dependent on the award in any
particular transaction. The arbitration clause should also provide for a venue that is
convenient to the consumer, and indicate that the arbitration will take place in the
county, state, or federal district of the consumer’s residence, or some other similar
place that is convenient to the consumer. Such a provision would of course be
subject to any relevant state limitations on venue. For example, the Wisconsin
Consumer Act, applicable to consumer credit transactions with an amount financed
of $25,000 or less, contains venue limitations.117 A wise practitioner should not
overlook state laws entirely when drafting an arbitration provision governed by the
FAA.
The clause should also provide that the arbitrator may award the types of
individual relief available in a court proceeding, including injunctions and punitive
damages. This ensures that in agreeing to arbitrate, the consumer has not forgone
any possible judicial remedies he may have had and thus reduces the theoretical
oppressiveness of the contract.
Like AT&T’s arbitration agreement that was at issue in Concepcion, another
provision a drafter may employ is a so-called “bump up” provision.118 Such a
provision provides that if the arbitrator issues an award to the consumer that is
greater than the creditor’s last written settlement offer, the creditor will pay an
116. See, e.g., Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 984–85 (Cal. 2003) (finding unconscionable a
provision allowing either party to appeal an initial award only if it exceeded $50,000).
117. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 421.401 (West 1988).
118. Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, The Impact of Concepcion on Consumer Financial Services
Arbitration Agreements and the Future of Consumer Litigation, CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES L. REP., May 25, 2011, at
3–4.
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additional dollar amount over the arbitrator’s award.119 For example, AT&T’s
arbitration agreement provided for a $7,500 “bump up,” plus double the amount of
the attorney’s fees.120 This directly addresses the consumer advocate argument that
mandatory arbitration agreements disadvantage consumers and deny them a
greater remedy that could only be achieved through class action litigation. In fact,
the California district court in Concepcion noted that the Plaintiffs were actually
better off under the arbitration agreement with AT&T than pursuing their claims
through class action litigation because with this provision they had a much better
opportunity at securing meaningful damages when compared to class litigation.121
The Concepcion Court noted that in class litigation, the Plaintiffs would have been
in class litigation for years (instead of months with arbitration) and that once a
settlement or verdict was reached, only then would they have an opportunity to
submit their claims for a small percentage of the dollar award.122
C. Standard Required General Language
There are also certain other important provisions that every well-drafted arbitration
agreement must include. Although they do not necessarily bear on whether the
clause would stand up to an attack based on the theory of unconscionability, these
drafting recommendations are nonetheless important and therefore included in this
Article.
The class action waiver is the focal point of any arbitration clause. Without a
class action waiver, one need not engage in arbitration. In addition to a class action
waiver, every arbitration clause should expressly adopt the FAA as the governing
law for its provisions.123 Thus, where the language of the clause leaves gaps that must
be filled or explained, those gaps will be filled or explained by the FAA, which is
generally more favorable to creditors. Like a venue clause, the agreement should
name one or more of the various arbitration organizations as the arbitrator (e.g.,
the American Arbitration Association or JAMS), and should also give the consumer
the option of selecting another arbitration organization to arbitrate the dispute,
subject to the creditor’s approval. By giving additional, more open-ended choices,
the creditor will be protected should one or more of the organizations cease
conducting consumer arbitrations and will gain some insulation from claims that a
particular arbitration organization is biased as to the creditor because the creditor is
a repeat customer.
119.
120.

Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note 111, at 4.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011); see Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note
111, at 4.
121. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., VERIZON WIRELESS CUSTOMER AGREEMENT ARBITRATION CLAUSE, available at
http://www.proandcontracts.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/2011.09.08-Verizon-Wireless-ArbitrationClause.pdf.

Vol. 8, No. 2 2013

381

Drafting Arbitration Agreements
Along these lines, the agreement should explicitly allow for either party to the
contract to request arbitration, but it should not require arbitration of every
possible dispute. This allows a creditor or consumer to proceed with a non-judicial
process or in court, and also to opt into arbitration as necessary, for example, if a
dispute leads to a class action. At the same time, the definition of “dispute” or
“claim” for which either party may demand arbitration should be broadly defined
to encompass disputes that occur in the application, origination, servicing, and
collection stages of a credit transaction. The agreement should indicate that the
arbitration will take place in the county, state, or federal district of the consumer’s
residence, or some other place convenient to the consumer. This is obviously a
consumer-friendly provision that goes to defending against attacks that the
agreement is substantively unconscionable.
Similar to a delegation clause in any standard contract, the arbitration agreement
should stipulate that the arbitrator will decide issues of arbitrability and
enforceability of the clause. The arbitration agreement should also provide for the
(hopefully) unlikely event that the class action waiver or other provision of an
arbitration clause is deemed unenforceable. If the class action waiver provision is
deemed unenforceable, a “poison pill” in the arbitration clause should void the
124
125
entire arbitration clause. As stated in Concepcion, arbitration and class actions
are incompatible, and therefore the arbitration clause should fail in the event the
class action waiver is deemed unenforceable. If any other provision is deemed
unenforceable, the arbitration clause should remain valid.
D. The Road Ahead
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the DoddFrank Act) requires the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (the “CFPB” or
the “Bureau”) to conduct a study concerning the use of mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration agreements by banks and other covered entities under the CFPB’s
supervision.126 Based on the conclusions of the study, the CFPB may impose
conditions or limitations on the use of such arbitration agreements and is even
permitted by the Dodd-Frank Act to prohibit their use altogether “if the Bureau
finds that such a prohibition or imposition of conditions or limitations is in the
public interest and for the protection of consumers.”127 Of course, such a
prohibition would apply only to those entities over which the CFPB has direct

124. Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 26 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted,
272 P.3d 976 (Cal. 2012).
125. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.
126. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1367, §
1028(a) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. titles 7, 12, 15, and 31).
127. Id. at § 1028(b).
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authority, but depending on the structure of a given consumer transaction, this
could cover a potentially wide swath of creditors.
The CFPB is currently conducting the study and because by law it is not
permitted to issue regulations until concluding the study, any potential regulations
would likely not be effective until 2014 or beyond.128 Still, the nature of the study
and its conclusions will provide an indication of what type of regulations the CFPB
might eventually promulgate, or whether the CFPB will prohibit arbitration
agreements altogether. Any drafter should remain aware of the Bureau’s study and
watch out for the regulations, which almost inevitably will be promulgated.

Conclusion
While the future of arbitration is uncertain, for the next couple of years arbitration
will remain a useful tool to quickly and efficiently handle individual consumer
disputes. By using arbitration clauses with the requisite class action waiver, creditors
avoid the time and expense involved in defending a class action.129 At the same time,
consumer complaints can be adjudicated by an arbitrator just as quickly and easily
(if not more) as in a judicial setting.130 Although arbitration clauses continue to be a
viable consumer contract option, as this Article has explained,131 such clauses must
be carefully drafted by competent counsel with consumer fairness in mind to
withstand enforceability challenges.132

128. Id. at § 1028(d) (providing that any regulation will apply only to contracts entered into 180 days after
the effective date of such regulation).
129. See supra Part III.
130. See supra Part I.A.
131. See supra Part II.A.
132. See supra Parts III.A–C.

Vol. 8, No. 2 2013

383

